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CURRENT HISTORY
January 2019
“Recent years have seen increasing sophistication in the sanctions that do the greatest damage
to critical networks or functions of a target country’s economy and infrastructure.”

The Hidden Power of the
New Economic Sanctions
JOY GORDON

I

n 1919, trying to persuade the United States to
join the League of Nations, President Woodrow Wilson touted the “boycott”—the League’s
primary tool of enforcement—as a powerful yet
bloodless means of stopping war:

There have been two broad trends in the use of
sanctions in the past two decades. First, contrary
to the standard narrative of the rise of precisiontargeted sanctions, they are, with some consistency, systemic. They seek to undermine systems
on which the target country’s core functionality
depends: its access to the international banking
network, its imports and exports, and its energy
sector. The second trend is the evolution of complex arrangements that serve to obscure the sanctioner’s role, particularly in regard to the humanitarian damage done.

A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in
sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no
need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not
cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it
brings a pressure upon that nation which, in my
judgment, no modern nation could resist.

While blockades and sieges have been used as
forms of warfare since ancient times, the twentieth century saw the introduction of economic
measures as a powerful means of enforcing international law. Sanctions were described by Wilson and others since in odd, contradictory terms.
They were unlike warfare—there were no planes,
bombs, or bullets involved. Yet their power was
precisely in the damage they could do, even if that
damage was less obvious and seemed less violent.
This tension is still at the heart of current trends in
how sanctions are formulated, applied, and justified.
In the past twenty years, the development of targeted “smart” sanctions has been widely viewed as
resolving the core tension in the use of economic
sanctions. They are seen as ensuring the effectiveness of sanctions, while sparing vulnerable populations from the collateral damage that occurred in
the past. But how they have worked in practice is
very different.

UNCONSTRAINED POWER
After World War II, sanctions were included
among the options available to the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) to respond to aggression
and threats to international peace and security.
But they were rarely used; the mutual veto powers of the permanent members meant that the
UNSC’s enforcement powers were largely paralyzed.
Sanctions were used by national governments to
achieve foreign policy objectives, but their impact
was limited. Comprehensive sanctions were not
possible, since any country that was targeted by
the Americans or the Soviets could simply turn
to the other bloc for its trade. When the United
States embargoed Cuba, the Castro regime could
still trade with the Soviet bloc. Consequently, the
humanitarian impact was limited as well.
While sieges and blockades had long been seen
as devastating and indiscriminate, it was not at all
clear that this might be true of economic measures
outside the context of war. For the duration of the
Cold War, scholars writing about sanctions were
mostly concerned with how effective they might be
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at pressuring the target state to change its behavcoalition led by the United States conducted a
ior, or how long an alliance of sanctioning states
massive bombing campaign that devastated Iraq’s
could stay intact without defections as shortages
industrial capacity, its electrical generators, its
of goods drove up prices and created opportunities
telecommunications system, its water and sewage
for profiteering. There was little discussion about
treatment plants, and most of its bridges, dams, and
the humanitarian impact of sanctions, apart from
major roads. The global sanctions then prevented
the case of South Africa.
Iraq from importing the equipment and materials
At the end of the 1980s, sanctions were widely
needed to repair and rebuild its infrastructure. In
seen as a humane and effective route to political
any case, the ban on oil exports meant that Iraq
reform in South Africa—imposing them on the
could not generate the income needed to pay for
apartheid regime drew little criticism except from
these goods.
the Reagan administration. So when Iraq invaded
The humanitarian impact was immediate and
Kuwait in 1990, there was considerable enthusevere. Iraqis suffered epidemics of cholera and
siasm on the part of nearly everyone, from pacityphoid, widespread malnutrition, and the nearfists to US military leaders, for the imposition of
collapse of health care and education. This crisis
sanctions on Iraq. But the UNSC had just undergave rise to considerable tension within the UN,
gone a radical transformation. The Soviet Union
as UNICEF and other agencies—as well as many
of the UNSC’s members—pressed the UNSC to alwas collapsing and no longer a counterweight to
low humanitarian goods into Iraq. While Iraq was
the Western permanent members, while China
permitted to import food after 1991, sanctions
showed no interest in contesting their influence.
continued to block much of what was needed to
For the first time since its inception, the vast powmeet the population’s needs
ers of the UNSC under the UN
Charter could be exercised to
for potable water, nutrition,
their fullest.
and adequate medical care.
Targeted sanctions are said
Under Chapter VII of the
In the mid-1990s, under
Charter, in response to threats
the Oil for Food Program,
to bear no resemblance to
to international peace and
Iraq was allowed to sell limindiscriminate past measures.
security the UNSC has broad
ited amounts of oil, the prodiscretion to impose an arceeds from which could then
ray of measures that “may inbe used to purchase humaniclude” severing diplomatic ties, prohibiting travel
tarian goods. But even then the UNSC permitted
very few imports that could be used to rehabiliand communication, cutting off trade, and using
tate the country’s foundering infrastructure. Almilitary force. Once such measures are adopted by
though food could be imported freely, the trucks
the UNSC, all member states of the UN are required
to implement them. There is no provision in the
needed to distribute it could not. When the UNSC
approved the purchase of a new water treatment
Charter by which a member state may question
plant, it blocked the electrical generator needed to
the UNSC’s decision, or decline to implement the
measures it has adopted. A country subject to such
run it, claiming that it had potential military uses
measures could not look to an ally or an opposing
in addition to its civilian uses. Such restrictions
bloc for trade or military support, since virtually
drew broad criticism internationally and within
every nation in the world would be bound to enthe UN, as well as from the Red Cross and other
organizations. For over a decade, the Iraqi populaforce the UNSC’s decisions.
That is what happened to Iraq. In response to
tion continued to suffer.
its invasion of Kuwait, the UNSC imposed nearly
‘SMART’ SANCTIONS
comprehensive sanctions, prohibiting both imIt was in this context that targeted sanctions—
ports and exports. They were disruptive from the
also known as “smart sanctions”—emerged. In
start, since Iraq was so dependent on oil exports
contrast to the comprehensive sanctions imposed
for its income, and was highly dependent on imon Iraq, smart sanctions primarily consisted of
ports for everything from food to equipment for its
narrowly tailored financial restrictions and asinfrastructure. Initially it was not even permitted
set freezes, commodity and arms embargoes, and
to import food.
travel restrictions. They were envisioned as a
But the real damage did not occur until the first
means of having a powerful impact on individual
Persian Gulf War in the winter of 1991, when a
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wrongdoers by targeting their personal assets or
their freedom to travel, or by blocking their access to weapons. The expectation was that these
targeted measures would not do the kind of broad,
indiscriminate harm to vulnerable sectors of the
population that was seen in Iraq.
Since the late 1990s, considerable effort and expertise has gone into the design and implementation of targeted sanctions. The Swiss government
facilitated a series of discussions on targeted financial sanctions, known as the “Interlaken Process.”
In 1999 and 2000, the German government sponsored the “Bonn-Berlin Process,” a series of expert
seminars and workshops on arms embargoes and
travel restrictions. The “Stockholm Process,” in
2002, was an initiative of the Swedish government
concerning many different aspects of targeted
sanctions. In 2009, the Targeted Sanctions Consortium was established at the Graduate Institute
in Geneva. The UN, several national governments,
scholars, the banking industry, and other affected
commercial sectors all have continued to invest
great effort in refining the design and use of targeted sanctions.
The view commonly held by these actors is that,
while the Iraq sanctions regime was tragic, things
have changed dramatically. In March 2016, US
Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew stated:
Not long ago, conventional wisdom dismissed
sanctions as blunt, ineffective instruments. The
old model was a countrywide embargo, which
provided little flexibility to mitigate disproportionate costs on innocent civilians—both in the
targeted countries and here at home. At the same
time, early efforts to ensure humanitarian relief
sometimes fell short of the intended goal. The
sanctions we employ today are different. They
are informed by financial intelligence, strategically designed, and implemented with our public and private partners to focus pressure on bad
actors and create clear incentives to end malign
behavior, while limiting collateral impact.

Asset freezes sometimes have been described as
the quintessential form of targeted sanctions. They
involve formulating blacklists of specific persons,
companies, and foundations, and imposing severe
penalties on banks, insurers, manufacturers, and
others that do business with these “specially designated nationals.” On the surface, these very specific lists seem to demonstrate what the political
scientist Clara Portela has called a “trend toward
the personalization and individualization of measures in the field of peace and security.”

The targeted sanctions that are employed these
days, it is often said, bear no resemblance to the
damaging, indiscriminate measures of the past. Today’s sanctions may be imperfect, since no policy
of this complexity could ever be completely successful in every possible situation. Nonetheless,
this narrative suggests, any damage to vulnerable
populations is unintended, and any “collateral
damage” is marginal.
In fact, this is not at all the case. At best such
claims apply, in some sense, to the sanctions imposed by the UNSC. Since the early 1990s, very few
of its sanctions regimes have—on their face—imposed broad restrictions on core sectors of a target state’s economy. But the same cannot be said
of sanctions regimes imposed by national governments, in particular the United States, or regional
bodies, especially the European Union. And on
closer inspection, it seems that even UNSC sanctions are often designed to do broad damage to
the target country’s economy, albeit by circuitous
means.

SYSTEMIC PUNISHMENT
Recent years have seen increasing sophistication in the sanctions that do the greatest damage to
critical networks or functions of a target country’s
economy and infrastructure. While these have become increasingly common over the past decade,
the template can be seen in the sanctions the United States imposed on Cuba in the early and mid1990s on top of the long-running embargo.
Up until 1990, 85 percent of Cuba’s trade was
with the Soviets and the Eastern Bloc. When the
Soviet Union dissolved, Cuba’s economy went
into free fall. The government scrambled to establish new trade partnerships in Europe and Latin
America and sought foreign investors. The tourism industry was rebuilt rapidly, and Cuba took
measures to increase its leading exports, sugar
and nickel. The country also had a strong science
infrastructure including over fifty biotechnology
centers, a burgeoning industry that was seen as a
promising source of revenue.
In 1992 and 1996, the United States enacted
the Torricelli Act and the Helms-Burton Act, laws
that directly targeted each of Cuba’s economic strengths and vulnerabilities. Any ships that
docked in Cuba were prohibited from docking in
a US port for six months, making all imports and
exports more costly and difficult. Foreign manufacturers could not send products to the United
States containing even trace amounts of Cuban
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materials, including nickel and sugar. Foreign investors who built hotels or industrial plants on
properties that had been owned prior to 1959 by
Cubans who were now US citizens could be sued
in US courts for “trafficking” in these properties.
Washington prohibited foreign banks from engaging in transactions with Cuba involving US dollars,
which meant additional costs and difficulties for
Cuba in all its foreign trade. US companies were
specifically prohibited from exporting to Cuba any
equipment or materials that could be used in developing or marketing biotech products.
These restrictions in fact applied not only to US
persons and businesses, but also to foreign companies that were subsidiaries of US corporations.
This “extraterritorial” reach drew considerable
indignation from the international community;
Canada, Mexico, and the EU adopted retaliatory
legislation. Even so, the bottom line was that foreign companies could not invest in Cuba without
risking their access to the US market, as well as the
costs of litigation and potential penalties imposed
by the US Treasury Department.
This became the template for US sanctions regimes for the next two decades: measures designed
to do maximum harm by neutralizing an economy’s greatest strengths and exploiting its vulnerabilities. They were imposed alongside measures
that compromised the country’s access to the international banking system and to the infrastructure for all of its imports and exports.
The United States has imposed sanctions regimes more frequently, more harshly, and for longer periods than any other nation in the world.
The use of sanctions, particularly extraterritorial
and systemic sanctions, increased greatly under
the Obama administration, and that practice has
continued under President Donald Trump. To
some extent, the United States has been joined by
like-minded allies, particularly since around 2010.
Concerned by Iran’s burgeoning nuclear program,
the EU, which had opposed unilateral US measures
in the 1990s, joined Washington in imposing
damaging measures designed to cripple the Iranian economy.
Perhaps the most striking instance was the
EU’s decision to exclude Iranian banks from the
Brussels-based Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the messaging hub that facilitates most of the transfers
among the world’s banks. While there are some
other avenues for trade or financial transfers, such
as barter arrangements or the informal hawala sys-

tem used in the Arab world, there is no substitute
for access to SWIFT, the global standard for international banking transactions. To expel a nation’s
banks from SWIFT does immediate and irreparable
damage to that country’s ability to sell its exports
or services; to purchase fuel, raw materials, and
other imports; to transfer funds among businesses
or family members; and to purchase even those
humanitarian goods that are ostensibly allowed,
such as pharmaceuticals. Attracting foreign investment under a SWIFT ban is exceedingly difficult,
since fund transfers related to business operations
become a logistical nightmare.
Iran’s major banks were excluded from access
to SWIFT from 2012 to 2016. Whatever other damage was done by sanctions, or the Iranian government’s economic policies, or anything else, the expulsion from SWIFT in itself caused immeasurable
disruption to Iran’s economy.
Sanctions regimes of this kind are indeed “targeted,” but not in the way that is usually meant.
They do not single out wrongdoers, leaving the
population as a whole unaffected. They are targeted at the core systems of the country’s economy
and infrastructure. The design of these measures
ensures that they will do extensive and indiscriminate damage to broad sectors of the population.

BANKRUPTING THE STATE
Claiming that a target state is corrupt or engaging in wrongful acts, a sanctioner may impose
measures to interfere with the state’s assets and
revenue sources. This can be done by seizing or
freezing its financial accounts abroad, or prohibiting the purchase of its natural resources, such as
timber or oil.
Bankrupting the state can have far-reaching
consequences for the population as a whole. It
may lead to job losses in state-run industries, or
make it impossible to maintain the country’s infrastructure, or to continue providing social security,
including pensions, or state subsidies for basic
goods, such as food and gasoline. For an economy
that is highly centralized, or a socialist state that
provides health care, education, and extensive services, the damage done by disrupting the state’s
sources of income will be magnified.
For example, in 2003 the United States adopted the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act,
responding to human rights concerns over the
actions of Myanmar’s military junta. It targeted
industries, such as textiles, that were important
revenue sources for the regime. But US textile

The Hidden Power of the New Economic Sanctions • 7

sanctions affected the industry as whole, which
individuals and companies. These measures were
may have resulted in the loss of some 60,000 jobs
expanded dramatically in November 2018, followin 2003 and 2004.
ing the US withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear
agreement. While the Trump administration has
In 1998, the EU imposed sanctions against Serbia, including state-owned companies, in response
encountered some resistance, and has granted
to the war crimes committed against Kosovo. The
waivers in some cases to allow other countries to
companies, in turn, were unable to pay salaries
continue trading with Iran, the sanctions are deand pensions to their employees, or to do business
signed to compromise Iran’s energy sector as much
with the private firms that relied on them.
as possible.
Recent US sanctions against Venezuela speCUTTING OFF BANKS
cifically blocked its efforts to restructure its debt.
Enormous damage to a target state’s economy
Venezuela has some $65 billion in outstanding
can be done with great efficiency by cutting off its
bonds and is now in default on its debt payments.
access to the international banking system. While
As the government sought to renegotiate the terms
such measures may be successful in preventing
of its debt with its creditors, Trump issued an exillicit arms transfers or corrupt practices by govecutive order in August 2017 prohibiting all “US
persons”—which the US government considers to
ernment officials, they will also compromise a vast
include many of Venezuela’s creditors in Europe
range of ordinary and essential financial transacand elsewhere, if they use the US financial systions. Those may include everything from family
tem—from extending new credit for more than
members sending remittances to their relatives, to
thirty days, effectively blocking Venezuela from
payments for food and medicine, or the purchase
restructuring its debt. In addition, the United
of raw materials and equipment for industry and
States has blacklisted many
the infrastructure a modof Venezuela’s top governern country needs to funcment officials, including all
tion.
Complex arrangements obscure the
those appointed to negotiThe target country may
sanctioner’s role, particularly in regard
ate with creditors. These
try to implement some sort
to the humanitarian damage done.
measures have underof workaround, such as
mined Venezuela’s efforts
barter arrangements. But
to manage its debt crisis,
any such measures will be
which will surely worsen the humanitarian disascostly and difficult. There is no adequate substiter that is already taking place.
tute for access to the international banking system.
Cutting off a country’s access can be accomDRAINING ENERGY
plished by a variety of means, including expulsion
No modern economy can function without suffrom SWIFT. It is also done by blacklisting comficient gasoline for cars, trucks, and buses, along
panies and government institutions, as the United
with fuel for industry and for the electrical grid,
States did to many of North Korea’s major banks
which in turn is necessary to power water and
in 2017, including those linked to commerce, agsewage treatment plants, telecommunications,
riculture, and industry.
and domestic consumption. Accordingly, sancThe sanctioner may get the same result by tartioners have consistently sought to compromise
geting individuals who hold key institutional positarget countries’ energy sectors.
tions, such as the head of the central bank. In the
In 2010, the European Council adopted meacase of US sanctions, blacklisting means not only
that the target’s assets are frozen, but that compasures specifically targeting “key sectors” in Iran’s
nies, banks, and creditors in the United States, and
oil and gas industry. Canada and Switzerland
possibly worldwide, are also prohibited from dobanned investment in Iran’s energy sector, as well
ing business with these individuals in their instias the sale of goods that could be used in oil and
tutional capacities.
gas production.
US sanctions on Iran have been broader than
SQUEEZING SHIPPING
those of any other government, restricting or proThe sanctions regimes of the past two decades
hibiting investment in the energy sector as well
have sought to block imports and exports in sevas the export and import of gas and petroleum
eral ways. These include blocking the export of
products, and blacklisting hundreds of Iranian
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specific commodities, such as oil or timber, and
affecting shipping, manufacturing, or the energy
interfering in the target country’s access to shipsector. It is rare that the UNSC adopts such measures explicitly.
ping. The EU has prohibited oil imports from Syria
and restricted North Korean vessels’ access to EuInstead, it may adopt resolutions that are sufropean ports. The US sanctions on Cuba, by proficiently vague that member states may invoke
hibiting any ship that docks in Cuba from docking
them as authorization to impose harsh and indisin a US port for six months, require Cuba in many
criminate measures, which then carry the impricases to pay for the transit of goods from, say, Eumatur of global governance. Starting in 2006, the
UNSC adopted a series of resolutions that required
rope, and then pay for the ship to return empty.
Since no trader or shipowner would transport
member states to freeze the assets of anyone with
goods without insurance coverage for the cargo,
ties to Iran’s nuclear weapons or ballistic missile
sanctioners have increasingly focused their efforts
programs; to prohibit the export of goods to Iran
for use in those programs; and to block the transit
on the insurance industry as a way of indirectly compromising the target country’s access to shipping.
of individuals associated with them. But the UNSC
The UNSC sanctions on North Korea include prohialso urged member states to “exercise vigilance”
bitions on providing insurance or other support for
regarding Iran’s key financial institutions.
any shipping that could contribute to North Korea’s
For example, the preamble to UNSC Resolution
1929, adopted in 2010, includes the following
nuclear or ballistic missile program. But the United
language: “recalling in particular the need to exerStates, the EU, and Britain prohibit the provision of
insurance more broadly to include all shipping to or
cise vigilance over transactions involving Iranian
from North Korea, as well as restricting transactions
banks, including the Central Bank of Iran.” If a
with its national insurance
member of the UNSC had
proposed a measure that
company.
In some cases, sanctionexplicitly sanctioned the
The United States has imposed
ers seek to undermine evcentral bank, it likely would
sanctions regimes more frequently,
erything related to shiphave met with opposition
more harshly, and for longer periods
ping. The US sanctions
from Russia and China, as
than any other nation in the world.
against Iran, for example,
well as some of the UNSC’s
elected members. But intarget its access not only to
cluding vague terms in the
shipping, but also to port
preamble was acceptable.
services, marine cargo insurance, and goods that
A “like-minded” group—the United States, the
can be used in its shipbuilding industry.
EU, Canada, Australia, and South Korea—then inOBSCURING RESPONSIBILITY
voked this language to justify national measures
Although it is often said that the tragic consethat were far more extreme than those contained
quences of the sanctions on Iraq have led to rein the UNSC resolution. The EU froze the central
bank’s assets, noting that “it is necessary to reforms that ensure sanctions are no longer a “blunt
quire enhanced vigilance in relation to the activiinstrument” that indiscriminately harms vulneraties of Iran’s credit and financial institutions.” But
ble populations, we have seen that is quite untrue.
the UNSC could not be accused of imposing meaSanctioners now make considerable efforts to find
sures that would damage Iran’s overall economy
ways to deny such effects, to minimize their severby blacklisting its central bank. At the same time,
ity, or to disavow responsibility.
the “like-minded” parties could say that it was not
While it is true that the language of UNSC resolutions for many years has not explicitly imposed
their choice to do so—they were only complying
a comprehensive embargo against a target country,
with the instructions of the UNSC.
Perhaps the most effective means by which sancit may do so in practice by circuitous means. This
tioners may disavow the results of their policies is
sometimes occurs through the use of what Henry
through the creation of conditions that trigger risk
Kissinger famously called “constructive ambiguassessments by private actors, who then withdraw
ity.” There would certainly be political opposition
from trade with the targeted country. This is parwithin the UNSC, most notably from Russia and
China, to proposed sanctions openly designed to
ticularly apparent in US sanctions policy. There are
a few variations of this strategy, but all of them
compromise the target country’s core institutions,
have three components: ambiguous regulations,
such as its central bank; or to blanket prohibitions
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very high penalties, and then a predictable risk
analysis by banks and other corporations.
In one variation, the US Treasury Department
first issues regulations that prohibit US banks from
engaging in financial transfers to government officials or military leaders in targeted countries. But
while a bank can check transfers against a published list of individuals and companies, it has no
means of knowing for certain who the end user
will be, or what the end use of the funds may be.
When the banks ask for clarification as to what
constitutes sufficient due diligence on their part,
they receive no clear guidance. Consequently, they
may never be sure whether they have met their legal obligations under US regulations.
And the stakes are very high. The United States
has imposed penalties in the billions of dollars on
banks that have facilitated improper transactions
under US law. Most notably, BNP Paribas of France
agreed to pay a total of $9 billion in penalties in
2014. Perhaps of even greater concern, its access
to the US Federal Reserve System was temporarily
suspended. Since the US dollar is the global reserve
currency, any international bank that cannot reconcile its dollar transactions through the Federal
Reserve banks can no longer operate. Such an exclusion is known as the “death penalty” for banks
in the international arena.
In response to these two conditions—ambiguous regulations and very high stakes—banks and
corporations typically decide that whatever benefit may be derived from doing business with the
targeted country is outweighed considerably by
the risk. Because the requirements for compliance
with US law are unclear, it is not possible to reduce
their risk of committing an inadvertent violation.
So they choose instead to sever all business ties or
transactions with the targeted country, even those
that may be legally permitted. This is known as
“de-risking.”
Since major banks and large corporations often
evaluate their risk using the same process, the target country will find it exceedingly difficult to find
any bank that is willing, for example, to facilitate
payment for pharmaceuticals, even if they are not
prohibited by the sanctions. The same obstacles
confront individuals who wish to send remittances to family members, humanitarian organizations
seeking to ship vaccines to the targeted country,
and charities trying to send funds or goods after an
earthquake or other natural disaster.
The result is that a unilateral policy by a national government in effect functions as a denial of ac-

cess to the global banking and insurance sectors,
compromising not only ordinary trade and commerce but even humanitarian transactions that
are ostensibly permitted. Yet the sanctioner may
disavow all of this. If banks don’t want to do this
sort of business with Iran, Cuba, or North Korea,
it will say, that’s not because the Treasury Department has prohibited medical sales or family remittances—these private actors simply choose not to
do business with shady actors.

SMART AS HELL
It seems that Woodrow Wilson was quite right
in his depiction of the “boycott” in contradictory
terms, as somehow both “peaceful” and “deadly”
at the same time. We might say that its successor—targeted sanctions—has followed a similar
path. They were originally envisioned as powerfully effective, yet humane. Just as the language
of “smart bombs” conjures up images of surgical
strikes, the language of “smart sanctions” has us
imagining a tyrant seething in fury when he finds
he cannot get at his bank account in Zurich.
The reality is quite different. Bombs may indeed
be precision-guided; but they may also, with precision, be aimed at neighborhoods and schools.
Sanctions may be targeted as well; but the targets
can include a country’s financial system, its access
to gasoline and electricity, and its ability to ship its
goods for export and to find ships that will transport what it needs to operate its infrastructure, or
to meet the needs of its population. However they
may have been envisioned, and however they may
currently be described, what we have seen in the
past two decades is that “smart sanctions” are particularly smart at doing great damage, with great
efficiency, to the fundamental systems needed for
any nation to function.
Within the UN, from time to time there have
been calls for reform, including review of sanctions regimes for compliance with international
humanitarian law. For the most part, those proposals have not come to fruition. The EU courts
have intervened in some cases, invalidating asset freezes where due process was found lacking.
But US sanctions have even fewer safeguards. The
president has enormous discretion to impose sanctions—Trump even threatened to punish Ecuador
with trade sanctions last summer for introducing
a resolution in favor of breast-feeding at a meeting
of the World Health Organization.
Within the United States, its sanctions regimes
draw little opposition since they are almost uni-
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versally seen as an attractive alternative to measures that are riskier and costlier, such as military
intervention. Even when US sanctions accelerate a
humanitarian crisis, as in Venezuela, or compromise the availability of medicines, as in Iran, there
is little accountability. Presented with a picture
of a child killed in a bombing, most people will
feel a sense of tragedy and see the injustice clearly.
With sanctions, severe damage may be done when
a country’s exports and imports are paralyzed because shipping lines cannot obtain insurance coverage to carry their goods. Few people would have
much interest in the intricacies or moral implica-

tions of marine cargo insurance. Yet as we saw in
Iraq, the human damage from compromising a nation’s exports and imports may be far greater than
that caused by an airstrike.
Sanctions will continue to be used frequently,
mostly by powerful nations. It will be hard to articulate what is morally wrong with them, in part
because the human costs are so diffuse and gradual. Proponents will keep describing sanctions as
“smart,” humane, and precise, even while they
are precisely targeted to do the greatest harm
possible to the systems on which whole populations rely.
■

